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ANTITRUST LAW-SHERMAN ACT-SECTIONS 1 AND 2-CLAYTON
ACT-SECTION 4-INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM "PERSON"-The Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that foreign nations are
entitled to sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.
Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
In 1974, the governments of India, Iran, and the Phillipines,
brought separate actions in federal district court seeking treble
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act' against six pharma-
ceutical companies.3 The plaintiffs alleged that the companies had
violated sections 11 and 21 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to
restrain and monopolize interstate and foreign trade in the manu-
facture, distribution, and sale of tetracycline. Among the practices
in which the defendant companies allegedly engaged were price fix-
ing, market division, and fraud upon the United States Patent Off-
ice.6 Because the drug companies believed that foreign governments
were not "persons" entitled to bring suit under section 4 of the
Clayton Act,7 they moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a
1. Vietnam was a party to the suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota, and was a respondent in the petition for certiorari. Vietnam's complaint was
dismissed by the district court since the United States no longer recognized the government
of Vietnam. Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977).
2. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, No. 74-48 (D.
Minn., filed Dec. 27, 1975). The suit brought by India was but one of the more than sixty
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions which were consolidated for pretrial purposes in the District of
Minnesota. Each suit was based on allegations that certain drug companies conspired to
exclude competitors as well as to fix the prices of antibiotic drugs abroad.
3. The six pharmaceutical companies were Pfizer Incorporated, American Cyanamid
Company, Bristol Meyers Company, Squibb Beech-Nut Corporation, Olin Corporation, and
Upjohn Company. Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
4. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states,
or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) [hereinafter referred
to as section 11.
5. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or to
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section 21.
6. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
7. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
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claim.' The United States District Court for the District of Minne-
sota refused to dismiss the action, relying on Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions," for the holding that a foreign government is a "person"
entitled to sue under the antitrust laws. 0
On May 19, 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, which had earlier ruled that the proprietary inter-
ests of foreign governments could not be challenged on mandamus,"
heard the appeal as a certified question. 2 In affirming the district
court's decision, the court of appeals relied upon the United States
Supreme Court's decisions of United States v. Cooper 3 and Georgia
v. Evans, 4 each of which had focused upon the interpretation of the
term "person" in antitrust legislation.
Dissatisfied with the court of appeals decision, the drug compa-
nies appealed to the United States Supreme Court and were granted
certiorari. 5 Following an exhaustive analysis of section 4 of the
Clayton Act, the Court affirmed, concluding that a foreign govern-
ment is a "person" entitled to sue for treble damages under section
4 of the Clayton Act.8
Justice Stewart, speaking for a majority of the Court, noted that
not only has the scope of remedies provided by the antitrust laws
been broadly interpreted,"' but also that the legislative history of the
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section 4].
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under this rule, a pleader's motion can be based upon the
defense that there is a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
9. 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Kuwait brought a treble damage antitrust action
against certain drug manufacturers for alleged price fixing in the sale of antibiotics. In
Kuwait, Judge Lord recognized that any conspiracy to eliminate or reduce competition of
foreign drug sales would have an adverse effect on domestic competition. The court reasoned
that to deny Kuwait's action would frustrate the goals of the antitrust laws, and concluded
that the maintenance of the action was "essential to the effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws." Id. at 316.
10. 333 F. Supp. 315.
11. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975). The court of appeals denied a request
for mandamus without reaching the question of whether a foreign government is a "person"
within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 15. Because Judge Lord had earlier ruled in Kuwait that
foreign nations are "persons" within the coverage of the Clayton Act, the court ruled that
mandamus would not lie to review the ruling of the district court.
12. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 550 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1975) aff'd, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
13. 312 U.S. 600 (1941). See note 25 and accompanying text infra.
14. 316 U.S. 159 (1942). See note 29 and accompanying text infra.
15. 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
16. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. at 320.
17. In support of this proposition, Justice Stewart cited Mandeville Island Farms v.
American Crystal Sugar, 334 U.S. 219 (1948). Mandeville Island involved price fixing by
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Sherman Act failed to demonstrate an intent to exclude foreign
nations from its provisions. 8 However, he recognized two attributes
possessed by the pharmaceutical companies that could arguably
exclude them from section 4 coverage. First, Pfizer argued that the
legislative history of the Sherman Act indicated an intent by Con-
gress to protect only American consumers. 9 Second, Pfizer at-
tempted to distinguish these respondents since they were foreign
nations, contending that the word "person" was clearly understood
by Congress when it passed the Sherman Act to exclude sovereign
governments. 2
In disposing of the initial contention, the Court observed that the
Sherman and Clayton Acts each provide that the word "person"
shall include foreign corporations,2' and also noted that Congress
had made explicit references to "foreign nations" in both of the
Acts.2 2 This specificity in terms was viewed by the Court as a clear
expression of Congressional intent not to limit treble damage reme-
dies only to United States consumers. 3 Moreover, the Court recog-
nized that to deny foreign nations the right to sue would defeat the
section 4 policies of deterring antitrust violations and compensating
the victims of antitrust violations.2 4
California sugar refiners in their purchase of California sugar beets. The refiners' defense,
that their agreement had no effect upon interstate commerce, did not enable them to avoid
treble damage liability. The Court recognized that Congress intended the effect of the Act to
be far-reaching and stated that:
The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to com-
petitors, or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done
by any of these. The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage protecting all who
are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.
Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
18. 434 U.S. at 312.
19. Id. at 313.
20. Id.
21. Id. Both sections state that a "person" shall be "deemed to include corporations...
existing under . . . the laws of any foreign country." 15 U.S.C. §§ 7, 12 (1970)(emphasis
added).
22. 434 U.S. at 313. Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal contracts, combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce "with foreign nations." Section 2 proscribes
monopolizing and conspiring and attempting to monopolize commerce "with foreign na-
tions." Section 1 of the Clayton Act expressly refers three times to commerce "with foreign
nations."
23. Id. at 314.
24. In support of this statement, the Court cited Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977). In Illinois Brick, the Court held that to deny a foreign government injured by an
antitrust violation the right to sue would defeat the two purposes of section 4. These purposes
are to deter violators by depriving them of the "fruits of their illegality," and "to compensate
victims of antitrust violations for their injuries." Id. at 746.
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In considering the second contention, Justice Stewart noted that
on two prior occasions the Supreme Court had considered whether
a sovereign government is a "person" within the meaning of the
antitrust laws and had rejected the mechanical rule urged by the
petitioners. In United States v. Cooper, 5 the Court had denied
standing to the United States government in an action for treble
damages under section 7 of the Sherman Act.2" According to Justice
Stewart, the Cooper result was premised upon legislative debates
as well as the fact that the United States has alternative remedies
to enforce antitrust compliance.2 Justice Stewart next considered
Georgia v. Evans,29 in which the Court concluded that the state of
Georgia had standing to sue under section 7. The Evans Court rea-
soned that unlike the enforcement remedies available to the United
States government, 0 there would be no means for the state effec-
tively to redress antitrust violations if standing were denied.3' The
Pfizer Court likewise concluded that the antitrust laws do not pro-
vide alternative remedies for foreign nations as they do for the
United States, and, consequently, foreign sovereigns must be
25. 312 U.S. 600. In Cooper, the United States brought a treble damage action for anti-
trust violations against the Cooper Company, alleging that Cooper and others had illegally
combined to fix prices of articles purchased by the United States.
26. Although section 7 of the Sherman Act was repealed in 1955, section 4 of the Clayton
Act, which now covers the remedies under the Sherman Act, contains identical language.
27. That Congress intended to preclude the United States from bringing a treble damages
action was stated as early as the legislative debates when Senator Sherman remarked that
the United States was excluded from section 2. Section 2 was the civil damage section that
later became section 4 of the Clayton Act. See 21 CONG. REc. 2563 (1890).
28. 434 U.S. at 317. See United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. at 607. The Cooper Court
pointed out that section 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1970), as well as sections 1
and 2, impose criminal sanctions for violations of the acts denounced therein. The Act vests
jurisdiction in the federal courts in proceedings by the government to restrain violations of
the Act and imposes upon the United States attorneys the duty to institute equity proceed-
ings to that end. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). Section 5 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1970),
regulates service of process in such suits. Section 6 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1970),
authorizes seizure, in the course of interstate transportation of goods owned under any con-
tract or pursuant to any conspiracies made illegal by statute.
29. 316 U.S. 159. In Evans, the State of Georgia brought treble damage actions against
asphalt dealers who had combined to fix prices and suppress competition in the sale of
asphalt in violation of the Sherman Act.
30. Id. at 161. The Evans Court stated that the United States chose three potent weapons
for enforcing the Act-namely, the threat of criminal prosecution under sections 1, 2 and 3;
the remedy of injunctive relief under section 4; and seizure of property under section 6. The
Court concluded that Congress did not choose to grant the United States the remedy of
damages in civil actions.
31. Id. at 162.
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granted standing to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act.32
Dissenting, Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Powell and
Rehnquist, agreed with the majority that the starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.33 How-
ever, the dissenters believed that because Congress chose to include
foreign corporations as "persons" entitled to sue under the Sherman
and Clayton Acts did not likewise reflect an intent to include foreign
nations within the statutory definition .3  Rather, Burger perceived
the failure of Congress to make similar explicit provisions for foreign
nations to be a deliberate omission that indicated a clear intent to
exclude them from the statutory definition of "person". 5 He also
declared that the legislative history of the treble damages remedy
under section 4 of the Clayton Act gave no more support to the
result reached by the majority than did the language of the statute.
Burger found the majority's reliance on the absence of any express
Congressional intent to exclude foreign nations from taking advan-
tage of the treble damages remedy to be a remarkable innovation
in statutory interpretation. 3 Burger thus concluded that if contem-
porary circumstances should require new consideration of the word
"person" in the Clayton Act, that task would be properly one for
Congress in light of the sensitive political nature and foreign policy
implications of the question. 3
32. 434 U.S. at 318.
33. Id. at 321. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). In Blue
Chip, retail users of trading stamps brought an action against a stamp corporation and others
for violation of Rule 10b-5 of the Security Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court looked
to the language of Rule lOb-5 as a starting point for analysis, but added that before a court
can look to statutory construction, other sources must be consulted. "[T]here should be, at
least, unmistakable support in history and structure of the legislation." Id. at 756 (Powell,
J., concurring).
34. 434 U.S. at 321-22.
35. Id. Chief Justice Burger reached this conclusion after scrutinizing section 1 of the
Sherman Act and section 4 of the Clayton Act and discovering no mention of the term
"foreign nation."
36. In support of this position, Burger emphasized that at the time of the enactment of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, sovereigns were immune from suit, while corporations were
not similarly immune. Burger believed that this Congressional policy of exclusion extended
to antitrust legislation. See In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893) (suit permitted by a New York
citizen against a German corporation doing business in New York); Shaw v. Quincy Mining
Co., 145 U.S. 444 (1892) (suit permitted against a corporation in the district where the
plaintiff or defendant resides).
37. 434 U.S. at 322-23. The Court went on to state: "Respondents' claim that this dispar-
ate treatment cannot be justified today when foreign states effectively control many large
foreign corporations and when sovereign immunity has been limited. . . is not an argument
appropriately addressed to or considered by this Court." Id. at 322.
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Finally, Chief Justice Burger believed that the majority's reliance
on Evans was misplaced,8 and emphasized that there are cogent
differences between states and foreign sovereigns which the majority
failed to consider." First, he conceded that to deny domestic states
the treble damages remedy would effectively deny surrogate protec-
tion to American citizens in whose behalf the state acts, and for
whose benefit the Sherman Act was enacted. He concluded, how-
ever, that while the result in Evans was a tolerable taking of certain
liberties with the literal language of the statute, the same logic does
not even remotely apply to the situation of foreign nations. 0 Addi-
tionally, he observed that unlike the domestic states, who are con-
strained by the commerce and supremacy clauses, foreign nations
remain free to enact and enforce their own antitrust statutes to
provide them with a means of redressing anticompetitive practices
in which American corporations engage."
In a separate dissent, Justice Powell added that he perceived the
majority's "general policy" decision to grant foreign nations the
right to bring suit under section 4 to be clearly beyond the province
of the judicial branch in the absence of explicit legislative author-
ity. 42
The Pfizer Court's decision to construe foreign nations as
"persons" within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act is
supported by both the legislative intent underlying the Act as well
as by principles of statutory interpretation. Moreover, Congress has
tacitly approved the Court's construction, not only by declining to
enact legislation that precludes foreign sovereigns from bringing suit
under either the Sherman or Clayton Acts, but also by enacting
recent legislation granting foreign nations standing as antitrust
plaintiffs.
Although the Clayton Act is primarily a remedial statute,43 its
38. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
39. 434 U.S. at 326.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 326-27.
42. 434 U.S. at 329-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43. In the floor debates concerning the passage of the Sherman Act, Senator Sherman
stated that the nature of the statute was a remedial one. 21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890). Further-
more, when section 7 of the Sherman Act was re-enacted in 1914 as section 4 of the Clayton
Act, the House debates concerning the provisions related to private damages actions indi-
cated an intent to provide redress for "everyman" injured by antitrust violations. 51 CONG.
REC. 9073 (1914)(remarks of Rep. Webb). See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477 (1977) (section 4 is a remedial provision designed to afford redress to injured
parties by a multiple of the injury actually proved).
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purpose has significantly expanded beyond that of remedying indi-
vidual antitrust grievances. Congressional intent underlying the
enactment of the Clayton Act discloses that governmental enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws is to be supplemented by individuals
seeking redress for alleged violations." The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged this legislative purpose and emphasized that section 4
was intended to create a group of private attorneys general to en-
force compliance with the antitrust laws.' 5 It seems clear then, that
since section 4 has become such an effective supplemental agent for
enforcing compliance with the antitrust laws, the Court was correct
in including foreign sovereigns within the class of "persons" entitled
to bring suit under section 4.11An analysis of the principles of statutory interpretation likewise
supports the majority's construction of the statute. The majority
concluded that the absence of any explicit references to foreign na-
tions in the statutes did not necessarily evidence a Congressional
policy to exclude them from bringing suit. 7 As defined in section 1
of the Clayton Act, a "person" is to "include corporations and asso-
ciations existing under or authorized by the laws. . . of any foreign
44. See Macintryre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, 7
ANTrrausT BULL. 113 (1962)(sponsors of the Clayton Act in the House debates indicated that
they perceived treble damages suits to be an important means of enforcing antitrust law).
See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453 (1957), where the Court
stated: "Congress has, by legislative fiat, determined that such prohibited activities are
injurious to the public and has provided sanctions allowing private enforcement of the anti-
trust laws by an aggrieved party."
45. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). In Standard Oil, the State of Hawaii
brought an antitrust action against certain petroleum producers alleging monopolistic prac-
tices. Although Hawaii was not awarded damages since no specific injury was claimed, the
Court stated: "By offering potential litigants the prospect of a recovery three times the
amount of their damages, Congress encouraged these persons to serve as 'private attorneys
general'." Id. at 262.
46. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), where
the Court, in reversing the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, held that the doctrine of in pari delicto was not a defense in an antitrust treble
damages action. In reaching this decision, the Court stated: "We have often indicated the
inappropriateness of invoking broad common law barriers to relief where a private suit serves
important public purposes." Id. at 138-39. The Court also recognized that the purposes of
antitrust laws are best served by insuring that private actions are an ever present threat to
deter violations of the antitrust laws. The Court further stated: "The plaintiff who reaps the
reward of treble damages may be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant but the
law encourages his suit to further the overriding policy in favor of competition." Id.
See also Simpson v. Union Oil, 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (consignment dealer who failed to adhere
to a fixed resale price was permitted to bring an antitrust suit even though, by signing the
agreement, he had become a participant in the price fixing scheme).
47. 434 U.S. at 315-16.
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nation."4 In Helvering v. Morgan,9 the Court held that the term
"include" imports a general class even though individual items are
specifically designated in the definition. The Court in Helvering
further stated that a statute that "includes" certain designations
does not exclude others not specifically so designated in the absence
of a definite expression of such intent to exclude. Consequently, the
Court properly perceived that Congress' failure to include foreign
nations within the definitional section of the Act should not be
construed as evidence of intentional exclusion.
Further strengthening the conclusion reached by the Pfizer Court
is the fact that prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890,
foreign governments seeking a forum were permitted access to the
courts of the United States. 0 Although legislators were aware of
these judicial decisions when enacting the Sherman Act, they chose
to utilize language which did not expressly exclude foreign sover-
eigns from bringing antitrust suits.5' Additionally, between the en-
actment of the Sherman Act and the 1914 enactment of the Clayton
Act, a number of antitrust suits were brought in the courts of the
United States by foreign cities and nations.52 If the 1914 Congress
were dissatisfied with the situation and intended to preclude foreign
48. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
49. 293 U.S. 121, 125 (1934). The Court, in construing a statute, stated: "The phraseology
is . . . open to the construction that the word 'includes' is used as the equivalent of
'comprehends' or 'embraces' .
50. See The Sapphire v. Napoleon M, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 127 (1870). This action arose
after an American vessel had allegedly damaged a French sea vessel. Justice Bradley wrote:
"A foreign sovereign, as well as any other foreign person, who has a demand of a civil nature
against any person here, may prosecute in our courts. To deny him this privilege would
manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling." Id. at 130. See also Cotton v. United States,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 229 (1850). In Cotton the Court stated:
Every sovereign state is of necessity a body politic, or artifical person, and as such
capable of making contracts and holding property. . . . It would present a strange
anomaly, indeed, if having the power to make contracts and hold property as other
persons, natural or artificial, they were not entitled to the same remedies for their
protection.
Id. at 231.
51. At the time of the passage of the Sherman Act, the legislators used language that
facilitated an expansive reading of the statute. For example, Senator Sherman remarked that
"every person injured" should be redressed. 21 CONG. REc. 2563 (1890). Senator Davis stated
that "a universal right of action was being enacted," id. at 2612, and Senator Hoar character-
ized the Bill as directed at "international and interstate commerce." Id. at 3152.
52. See, e.g., French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Springs, 191 U.S. 427 (1903). In Saratoga
Vichy Springs, the French Republic brought a bill in equity to vindicate its rights under the
Industrial Property Treaty to exclusive use of the word 'vichy' on bottled water. The issue of
whether the French Republic could bring suit in the United States was resolved in favor of
the Republic.
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nations from bringing antitrust suits, specific prohibitions would
have been made at that time.
Recently enacted legislation also reaffirms Congressional ap-
proval of granting foreign nations standing as antitrust plaintiffs.
The Breton Woods Agreement,5 3 passed in 1970, urges foreign na-
tions to take steps to reduce obstacles to, and restrictions upon,
international trade. In light of this policy, it would seem to be incon-
sistent to deny a foreign nation access to this country's courts to
redress antitrust violations caused by American companies. Con-
gress has also enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
197651 which states that a foreign government can be sued when it
engages in commercial activity having any adverse effect on the
United States economy. Consistency as well as comity therefore
mandates that, if foreign governments are to be subjected to suits
for violating antitrust laws, they should correspondingly be granted
standing as antitrust plaintiffs.
Monopolies and conspiracies in restraint of trade cannot be toler-
ated in an economic system which encourages free enterprise if that
system is to continue to flourish. Therefore, the antitrust laws must
be broadly interpreted to include foreign nations within that cover-
age. Granting foreign nations standing under section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act serves to implement the deterrent aspect underlying the Act
and thereby insures compliance by potential antitrust violators.
Helen Lipchey Collins
53. 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1970).
54. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (1976).
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